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POLS 453  
American Foreign Policy

**Final exam**

June 27, 2003

**I. Long essay**

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Assessment of the war on terror and the war with Iraq from a realist and idealist point of view. America and the end of the Vietnam syndrome and the direction that American foreign policy should go from here.

Both the war on terror and the war with Iraq can be evaluated as realist actions, in that they protect national interests, as national interest is defined as the protection of American lives. The threat of al-Qaeda against clearly defined American interests was real before the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. (9/11). They were crystallized after 9/11 and the hunting down of terrorist around the world was instantly understood to be in America's vital national interests, from the realist standpoint that security of our people and borders are national interests concerns.

However, the war on terror will have to include idealist convictions and expansion of national interest to include the idealist view. Kagan argued that despite what the realist claimed, the Cold War was sustained by American ideals and guided by idealist principles. The war on terrorism is a war against those who are opposed to America as a superpower and to American influence through out the world. Terrorists are Barber's Jihad against America's McWorld.

In terms of realists' balance of power, the conclusion to Kagan's Guide to American Power may be that the power of terrorism is the emerging power replacing the void to the Soviet Union (S.U.) as the only balance to American hegemonic global power. Like the S.U. whose actions in the world were motivated by a combination of historical experience and communist ideology, terrorists' actions are backed up by their own historical experience combined with an ideology that supports their actions. They too are a patient, seductive power that will use subversive technique to battle those whom

it sees as permanent enemies. Their target is both the realists defined national interest of oil supplies, military bases, and American lives and the idealists defined national interests of American honor and prestige and American dedication to individual rights and freedoms. It will take a third way, as introduced in your lecture, a combining of realist, pragmatic view of the world as a stage, where power politics is real and states remain major players and idealists view of the importance of economic interdependence, regional cooperation and the encouragement of the kind of bottom-up democracy Kagan writes about. Realism guards us from overstretching, from being the world's police or social worker, from the bankruptcy of our resources and from forgetting that realpolitik still runs the world to a large degree. Idealism keeps us from being strictly amoral, from denying our desire to help people in the world and to spread the freedoms we enjoy to others. It also allows us to place human rights within our national interests. We will have to fight terrorism with military engagements, with heightened security measures and with intelligence and vigilance. We will also have to fight terrorism with public relations, the encouragement of regional cooperation, understanding of the root causes of terrorist ideology and a battle over ideas.

The war on terrorism is difficult to assess since much of it happens outside of the limelight and beyond the means of the CNN effect. The failure to produce bin Laden's head on a platter is a disappointment. The elimination of the Taliban and the safe havens for al-Qaeda networks is certainly a positive move. I am pleased that the U.S. is seeking out terrorist wherever they are but removal alone cannot be our only objective. We must stay to help pick up the pieces, respecting the non-terrorist communities whose lives we have disrupted. (Afghanistan, Iraq)

The biggest failure of the war on terrorism is the unleashing of John Ashcroft and his crusade against American civil liberties. I see this as a shortsighted hypocritical failure. You cannot fight the enemies of democracy with anti-democratic practices. The American public or the collective American conscious would choose the risks of terrorism, even after the horrors of 9/11, over becoming a nation without civil rights and liberties. War has been used as an excuse for such behavior before with the internment of Japanese Americans. It was wrong then, too.

The war on Iraq is still a bit of a mystery to me. I've mentioned in other essays that I think the jury is still out on this one. If I had to choose whether the war of Iraq was a realist or idealist approach to foreign policy, I'd have to choose, realist. If you use our impetus for the pre-emptive invasion, the existence of weapons of mass destruction (wmd) as the factor around which the realist or idealist judgment is to be made, then certainly this action was a realist one, protecting U.S. borders and national security, due to the possibility of wmd being used against us directly or on others in Europe. It can also be seen as idealists in that we have prevented those wmd from being used on innocent people. In addition to the claimed links of Iraq to al Qaeda networks. The rejection of the need for UN cooperation or approval (an arguable point, I understand) and the disregard for the strong dissent of many European nations can be seen as a realist rejection of internationalism and the idealist idea the national sovereignty should be sacrificed for international action and cooperative bodies of authority. If you listen to the post-almost completely victorious war- talk of the Bush administration than the war on Iraq was an idealist rescuing of the Iraqi people from their oppressor.

The war was successful, as wars go, in that it was relatively short, it was not another Vietnam, it reduced the number of civilian casualties, and Sadaam is gone; not dead but not in control. I can't determine yet where Iraq has failed except that it may have hurt America's credibility on the world stage. (lack of wmd) What happens next...five, ten or twenty years from now in Iraq will be the determining factor. How we handle North Korea now, whether we are able to pull off any peace deals in the Middle East; all of these things will help to determine whether the war on Iraq was a success.

### **Vietnam syndrome, dead or alive?**

America, to an extent, in my opinion, will never and should never get over the Vietnam syndrome. We should always be conscious of the lessons of history and heed them in every new endeavor. If the Vietnam lesson was, if you're going to do something, do it all the way or not at all, then the Gulf Wars did show that we learned the dangers of minimal involvement and graduation of force. The Gulf Wars has helped to heal the wounds of Vietnam. If the lesson of Vietnam was, understand your enemy then I'm not sure we've learned that one completely. I think the U.S. and the Bush administration could go farther in understanding people of Arabic nations in order to work with them

against terrorism and to defeat and fight extremism within those countries. If the involvement of the press and the assurance that the press's reports are accurate was a lesson of Vietnam, (avoidance of another Tet affair) the military's embedding of journalistic shows a learned lesson, despite criticism, that accuracy, objectivity and credibility may be sacrificed.

The tragedy of 9/11 had a hand in shattering the Vietnam syndrome. In Vietnam, it is said that many soldiers asked themselves, "What are we doing here?...What are we fighting for?" After 9/11 the citizens of America wanted someone's ass kicked. (pardon my French). Revenge, vengeance, a strong desire to see justice, not a vague commitment to contain communism, drove U.S. foreign policy against terrorism. I doubt that very many, if any soldiers in Afghanistan wondered what in the world they were doing there. They knew why they were there. They watched the towers go down along with everyone else. As far as 9/11 mobilized American resolve, it healed the wounds of Vietnam.

Vietnam has been healed. We have gone through some collective therapy but healing and forgiving are not forgetting. Our sense of history requires us to remember those lessons. We are conscious of the lessons of history everyday. The founding of our country, the lessons against European monarchy and religious intolerance affect us today. The lessons of Munich, of Yalta, of appeasement, of the horrors of the holocaust as well as Vietnam should guide us in our every political endeavor.

I think I have given some indication of the direction I think, American foreign policy should go from here. I hate to keep sounding like such a moderate, but I suppose I am. I'm against extremes in thought and have never been comfortable in either conservative or liberal camps. To that extent, I am neither a realist nor an idealist. Dr. Garcia, (boy, would he love the fact that I'm bringing him up!!) was more of an idealist and he helped me to see the benefits of regional cooperation, economic interdependence and international organizations as methods for solving many of the world's problems. Unlike classical idealist, however he denied that morality could be any part of politics, taking Foucault's idea that politics is the negotiation of power and power is inherent in every aspect of life. Dr. Garcia helped me to see that one way or the other are not the only options. Just as you introduced in our last lecture, there can be a third way. One in which sovereignty, cultural identity, balance of power, need to keep power in check with

diligence and the use of military force is balanced with ideas of honorable behavior, helping those in need, fighting human rights abuses, encouragement of bottom-up democratic movements and legitimacy of rule, and the battle of ideology over extremism. Dr. Garcia used to say that all problems boiled down to sovereignty, the fight for it, the attainment of it, the maintenance of it, the fight to keep it, the expansion of it and fear of losing it. He didn't completely accept these desires as legitimate justification for state's actions. I think he envisioned a world of increased interdependence and cooperation. I understand the need for both the maintenance of sovereignty and the need to cooperate and form alliances with the rest of the world.

I'm not sure I'm answering the question. I would like to see American foreign policy find a balance which would include realist concerns, which would maintain our military strength, continue the fight against terrorism, and continue to be concerned with security issues. I would like to see current and future administrations employ people who can advise, not only on matters of strategic importance and power balances, but also on matters of understanding that which we either hope to change and influence or are already changing and influencing. I would like to see a better understanding and respect for other cultures, a cultural relativism guide foreign policy. I would like to see this entire country learn from the McWorld effect. Why is it that other countries despise our market influence? Because they are not only getting better products and greater choice, they are getting all the trash and the deplorable aspects of our culture. I would like this country to look at everyone else's reaction to McWorld, see it as a reflection of our own demoralizing pop culture and actually change the way we live. This country continues to reach new heights of obscenity and depravity and stupidity. We may hope to export freedom and democracy and opportunity but what we are exporting is the glorification of violence, casual sex and the objectification of women. This is the biggest obstacle of the battle over ideas. Our culture provides fuel to extremism. It gives fundamentalists, even within our own culture, something to fight against.

## II. Short Essay

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### A. Cold War

1. The origins of the Cold War and the international landscape faced by Truman. America's attempts to implement containment from 1946-1950.

The Cold War originated in post-WWII actions of the Soviet Union (S.U.) and the slow realization by the U.S. that the S.U. was a real threat to the peace and stability of Europe and therefore, the U.S.

After WWII, Roosevelt and Stalin dealt with each other on sort of false pretenses, both of them assuming that the other was the same as himself. Roosevelt attempted to deal with Stalin as a reasonable politician who could be compromised with, just as American congressmen were compromised with. Roosevelt was operating from a set of ideas that saw war an interruption of the normal harmony of the world, something to be overcome. Stalin viewed peace as a different kind of war. He saw the west as his permanent mortal enemy. This view was supported by Russia's history of repeated invasion combined with communist ideology that pitted communism against capitalism and made compromise or friendliness impossible. He was a paranoid man who didn't trust Roosevelt and assumed that Roosevelt felt the same way toward him and the subsequent Soviet expansion invited American reactionary aggression and proved him right. Those within the State Department warned Roosevelt of Soviet aggressive tendencies but their advice was friendship with the S.U.

Before the end of WWII, the S.U. had annexed border territories. At Yalta, Stalin agreed to allow free-elections in Soviet occupied states in Eastern Europe and expressed hope for peace and security in the future. After the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1942, the S.U. controlled Berlin and East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and Albania. The Czech republic was already controlled by a communist regime. In these nations, the S.U. interpreted free-elections as the guaranteed election of a Soviet regime. To the U.S., the S.U. was going back on its pledge to allow these nations self-rule. This essentially was the origin of the Cold War. The S.U. saw its move to ensure its influence and power after WWII, as natural and understandable and assumed the U.S. would do the same. (Revisionists argue that the U.S. did do the same in the name of

democracy and security) The U.S. eventually accepted Soviet influence in Eastern Europe based on the S.U.'s security needs.

When the S.U. moved into the Mediterranean and Middle East however, its need for security was not justification for its actions. The S.U. pressured Turkey to allow Soviet bases and to relinquish some land bordering the S.U. among other demands. In Greece, the S.U. supplied military and economic aid to a resurgence of communist forces that had been fighting a civil war with right wing nationalist before and during WWII. In Iran, the S.U. refused to withdraw its troops and attempted to set up a satellite state. The U.S. and Britain threatened action and the S.U. withdrew from Iran.

Meanwhile, Churchill had warned the people of the U.S. against the realities of Soviet aggression. His warnings, Soviet actions and the advice of George Kennan led to the Truman Doctrine and the adoption of a containment strategy. Truman appealed to Congress and the public and gained funding to aid Greece and Turkey in their fight against forced communism. This was the first containment commitment.

Truman's implementation of containment included huge amounts of economic aid to Europe to rebuild those nations that could provide a front against communism and that were devastated by the war. (Marshall Plan) Truman proved himself committed to the fight against communism by his response to the S.U.'s blockade of West Germany. For some 300+ days airlifts brought in a continual stream of supplies, causing the S.U. to eventually lift the blockade after being convinced of U.S. commitment. Truman helped to create and encouraged the establishment of new international economic systems that included the IMF and the World Bank. In Europe regional economic alliances developed, precursors to today's European Union. All of these things were designed to eliminate depression-like collapses and discourage European inter-state strife and competition. Domestically, containment included the National Security Act, creating the CIA and Department of Defense as well as rebuilding American military might. The formation of NATO was another result of the Cold War as a protection against outside aggression upon Western states. These containment strategies and alliances were a break from traditional American isolationism and non-involvement in Europe's affairs.

Containment became militarized with the Korean War. North Korea with the help of the S.U. invaded South Korea, marking a change in Soviet methods of expansion with

an outward use of Soviet force. America appeared to be forced to react as a committed fighter of Soviet influence and communist takeover.

The stalemate results of the Korean War in addition to the loss of China were devastating to America who would come to question other endeavors of containment. (Vietnam)

The writing of history can never be truly objective, however examining the events of post-WWII Europe it is difficult to see how anyone could come to the conclusion that the U.S. provoked the S.U. into the Cold War. In fact, the argument could easily be made that Roosevelt was naïve in thinking that there could exist a friendly relationship between the S.U. and the U.S. Soviet ideology and Stalin's pathology left no other reality possible but aggression between the S.U. and the West. I believe containment was a justifiable and even moderate policy by a country who could not afford to ignore the dangers of Soviet aggression.

## **B. Post-Containment American Foreign Policy**

1. Carter's attempt to idealize American Foreign Policy, his successes and the collapse of his approach. The long-range consequences of his inability to be idealistic in his dealings with the world on the continuing debate.

Jimmy Carter was a devout, born again, evangelical Christian, a peanut farmer who had made to the governor's mansion and a good man! He came into the presidency in the post-Vietnam, post-Nixon era, when the public was tired of disappointments in our endeavors overseas and the moral failings of our leaders. Jimmy Carter, like Wilson and Roosevelt wanted to see an end to power politics. He wanted to focus on the troubles of the worlds and human rights. He wanted to end the East/West debate and begin to solve the North/South problem. Carter wanted to steer away from selfish national self-interest and work towards remedies of the inequities of the world, the poverty of underdeveloped nations, being one. In essence, he rejected realist thinking and wanted to choose the path of idealism, returning the U.S. to its traditional role of the beacon to the world of how life can be.

He tried to leave the Cold War, claiming its interests and its fear of communism overstated and in the past. His mistake was that he was the only leader on the nation-state

scene who thought this way. Everyone else was playing by realpolitik rules. The world was not ready to give up on power politics yet and the Cold War was still raging.

Carter believed that power politics could not solve social and economic problems. He encouraged increased international cooperation and use of economic aid as ways of solving the social problems of the world. In focusing on the Southern, less developed nations, Carter failed to see their part in the continuing Cold War as actors who were in competition between the two great powers, often resulting in U.S. support of bad leaders. Carter wanted to escape from this hypocritical morality. He attempted to change this policy, with bad results in Central America and Iran. He also failed to see that economic foreign aid became a way for dictators to play the U.S. and the S.U. against each other while no progress was being made with the aid.

Carter's biggest achievement was in the Middle East. He took advantage of the situation which Sadat, the leader of Egypt presented. Sadat had addressed the Israeli legislature in an unprecedented move and recognized Israel's right to exist. Though Begin, the Israeli prime minister, was not as amicable to a settlement, Carter showed initiative and courage and invited the two leaders to Camp David. As a result of his skill and determination the meeting ended in a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This lessened the possibility of future Arab-Israeli wars, as the other Arab countries could not attack Israel without Egypt. This treaty was a significant gain for the continuing conflict and a major achievement of Carters.

Unfortunately for Carter, power plays by state actors were still a part of world politics and Soviet expansion was still alive and well as shown by the S.U.'s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Ironically in light of recent events, according to Spanier, the S.U. invaded as a way of fighting religious fundamentalism and theocracy and its possible influence over Muslim Soviet populations. Carter saw the light, possibly too late, and became a hard-liner. (poor Carter, such a tragic presidency, much like Johnson's) Anyway, Carter reacted to the reality of Soviet continued aggression with increased military spending a freeze on sharing technology and a commitment to treat Soviet threats as threats to U.S. interest. In essence, he saw the reality of the nature of world's politics and his own policies began to reflect this new realization.

Carter's presidency ended tragically with the unresolved hostage crisis in Iran. In 1979 militant students captured 53 American embassy workers and held them hostage in Tehran. The students were part of a coup against the American supported shah. An Islamic theocratic regime took over the government and supported the student's actions. For the idealist, highly moral Carter this event was paralyzing. He confined himself to the White House, attempting to solve the problem. In an attempt that illuminated the state of the U.S. military expertise and preparedness, a rescue team went into Iraq and failed to achieve its mission, ending instead in accidents and American deaths. Rourke has an interesting paragraph or two about this in his discussion on groupthink. (International relations text book) He claims that many who were advising Carter knew the plan was flawed but didn't want to risk going against those who were for it or disappointing the president. Carter's attempt to appeal to the kind of international organizations he hoped would be the savior of the world were all for naught. The hostages came home after Iraq attacked Iran, which caused U.S. sanction to apply more pressure and Ronald Reagan, a man recognized to be tougher and more willing to risk American lives, was elected president.

The lesson of Carter's administration is that the reality of the world cannot be wished away by idealist dreams of a more perfect world. While idealism can encourage us to constantly work towards a world without wars and conflict we must face the realities of the world we live in. Biology teaches that humans are naturally aggressive. We do have natural tendencies toward self-interest and power plays. Just as America sees itself as the light on the hill, humanity sees itself as more than biology and continues to place expectations upon itself to be more perfect beings. In our political endeavors we must recognize the reality of the world, while continuing to strive to be more.

### **C. The Foreign Policy Process in the Modern Period:**

1. Foreign policy in post-Vietnam era is difficult to manage. Public opinion, the media and special interests have a large influence on policy making. New actors, such as think tanks now have an increased influence as well.

Foreign policy has risen to the level of everyday concern for citizens of this country, with globalization and the increased interconnectedness of the world. The world is smaller today than it was fifty or a hundred years ago. What happens in the world today is the concern of everyone, as 9/11 proved. Foreign policy making has become more politicized and democratized. Everyone wants a voice in America's policy making. The disillusionment over the Vietnam War and events such as Watergate led the public to become more involved in the process with a desire to avoid mistakes made.

The role of public opinion in influencing American foreign policy can be seen through the example of the Tet offensive of Vietnam and the way it was reported in the media. During the Tet offensive, the Vietcong staged a huge offensive against American forces in an urban area of South Vietnam. The first indication given to the public by the press was that the offensive was successful for the Vietnamese and American forces were losing the battle. The Vietcong were able to penetrate the U.S. embassy compound and all of this was shown to the public on television. While the Vietcong actually suffered tremendous losses under the U.S. counter attack and the Tet was considered a victory for U.S. forces, the perception by the U.S. public that it was a devastating defeat was the straw that broke public opinion's back. The anti-war movement was mobilized into a huge, active political force. This solidified the media's role as an influence over American popular behavior and foreign policy concerns, as it would continue to be in the future. The emotional and political impact of the anti-war movement was strong and influenced American foreign policy leader's willingness to enact foreign policy without the support of the American public again.

This CNN effect, the result of media coverage of all events from around the world, all the time to everyone creates an atmosphere where U.S. demands for action or cessation of action can be the result of seeing things on television, that they may not have

been aware of or concerned over in previous years. This can be both good and bad. The public can motivate government to do the right thing and help those in the world that need our help. It can also be bad, in that the media, with interests of its own, determine what we see, when we see it and how we see it. The public reacts with emotion to images without knowing the whole picture or the full story. While the media is divisive, sensationalistic, narrowly focused and subjective, the American public is often ignorant, under-educated with a lack of historical perspective, and reactionary with a short attention span.

Interests groups, people working towards a specific policy or policy change also influence the process. They are educated and focused on their goal and work diligently toward its achievement. Some see them as part of a healthy democratic system while others argue that their focus is too narrow and does not reflect the true will of the people. They are outside the mainstream of public concerns and needs and are increasingly too powerful, hijacking the system away from the needs of the non-interest group public. The number of interest groups attempting to influence policy makes it difficult for rational policy to be made as each group battles for its own narrow interests. Interest groups are inherently biased and don't look for real solutions to real problems based on truth and understanding. They block the view of the big picture.

New actors on the stage are organizations called think tanks that seek to answer the problem of interest groups. Think tanks are organization dedicated to the researching and studying of public policy issues, both domestic and foreign and presenting information, solutions and suggestions for policy makers so that they may be better able to make informed decisions. They are designed to do the government's thinking. While they seem like the ideal solution to the problem of understanding and knowing everything about a particular problem, they present their own problems. They have become increasingly ideological, promoting one set of subjective objectives. They are elitist and out of touch with and out of the view of mainstream America. They operate with little oversight.

Overall think tanks can be a positive development in the public policy process. Unlike the media and interests groups they are experts in their fields who are able to put

time and energy into understanding and solving problems; the kind of time and energy lawmakers, the media and the public are not giving to policy issues.

My opinion of these influences over the policy process are mixed. I think the media can and should play an important role as the government's watchdog and the objective informant to the American people. The public in turn must insist on more objective reporting based on facts and information, not sensationalism. The media has increasingly taken the role of informing the public about how they should feel and think about issues. The media should be telling us what is happening, where it is happening and who is involved but not how we should be feeling and thinking about it.

I fear the day the America engages in a war without any voice of dissent heard from the public. I think public dissent and public opinion are important and necessary and a wonderful reminder of the freedoms we enjoy in this country. However, public opinion can only be as useful as the information it's based on.

The activity of think tanks appeals to my desire to have more objective understanding. Though flawed, they seem to be institutions with people searching for the truth and hoping that someone will listen.

### **III. Reading Identifications:**

#### 2. Kagan's argument about American power

Kagan calls for a redefinition of previously, narrowly defined national interests as America embraces its role as hegemon of the world. He rejects earlier realist definition of national interest as scientifically measurable and defined by geopolitical strategic importance. He makes his point by way of a little history of realism from the 40's to today. (today being 1996) He critiques the realist thought that attempted to narrow America's involvement in the world to what it defined as vital national interests. Kagan points out that American national interest was never set in stone and requires flexibility as the world stage changes. He rejects realist assertions that national interests and foreign policy should be amoral and devoid of ideological concerns or actions based on morality and principle. He asserts that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union revealed flaws in realist thought.

Realists' fears that multi-lateral power alliances in Europe would fill the Soviet void if it fell apart were proven false, as they did not materialize. America's idealism and faith in the rightness of its way of being and the wrongness of communist way of life guided and sustained our interest in fighting the Cold War and led us to the position we found ourselves in, in 1996 as the sole superpower of the world. In the end Kagan asserts that the realists are needed to remind us that all powers fall and that peace is merely an inter-war period. We can go forward in maintaining our idealism without losing the diligence of Cold War attitudes.

#### 5. Barber and "Jihad vs. McWorld"

Barber, in 1992, writes in this article about two opposing forces at play in the world at the same time, neither helping democracy to flourish in the world.

McWorld is his nickname for essentially, globalization of the world economy and along with it world culture, especially American culture. The following are characteristics of McWorld:

- the dominance of multi-national corporations, banks, CNN, and OPEC-like alliances as major actors without regard for culture, religion and national identity or boundaries
- the right to shop is a force of change and influence, even inspiring forces of liberation where demands for natural or civil rights do not
- the discouragement of strife and war as an interference of the market place
- a disconnect to issues of human or civil rights and democracy as irrelevant to the functioning of the market
- the identification of individuals through work and career instead of national identity, religion or race
- the importance of cooperation and openness as necessary elements of scientific and technological advance
- the reality of the depletion of the world's resources
- the proliferation of a homogenous world culture, more potent than armaments

Jihad refers to the rise of nationalism and the fight of minority groups for their own sovereignty within larger nation states. It is an arena where cultural or religious identification is paramount and McWorld, globalization and modernity are enemies. It is an opposing force of disintegration where McWorld is one of homogeneity. It is the fight of parts of the whole; of sects, factions, fundamentalists and various groups separating themselves from a larger whole based on realities of culture and history or proselytized aberrations of traditional views. It is an arena where war provides justification and solidarity. Jihad discourages freethinking and democracy and flourishes with autocratic, theocratic oppressive rulers who encourage the recognition of differences and hatred of all others, discouraging openness, tolerance and education.

Barber says the world is falling apart (Jihad) as it is reluctantly coming together (McWorld). Neither force is creating nor promoting democratic ideals. Both can flourish without it. Barber's prescription is regional confederations of nations with local autonomy and larger representational government. (Where have I heard that before?) He cites the American Confederation of States as a model and calls on the promoters of democracy to take a cue from the green movement and "think globally, act locally." He requires those who wish to fight Jihad to seek out democratic leanings and tendencies in small communities, then foster and nurture them until they flourish instead of attempting short-term, top-down democratic influences. In the end Barber hopes that "democracy can be a form of coherence as binding as McWorld and a secular faith as inspiring as Jihad."